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INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND COLLECTIVE
RATIONALITY: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
Bruce Chapman*
In recent years there has been much discussion of two theorems
in economics that relate individual rights to Pareto optimality. In the
area of law and economics, Ronald Coase is well known for demonstrating that in a world without transaction costs bargaining will always result in a Pareto-efficient outcome, whatever the initial distribution of rights.' In social choice theory, however, Amartya Sen has
shown that for certain configurations of individual preferences, the
reasonable exercise of individual rights can lead to outcomes that are
Pareto-inferior to other outcomes that are attainable. Clearly, there
is some tension between these two results. The purpose of this paper
is to point to the lessons we might learn froni Sen's theorem in particular and from social choice theory in general, and to suggest some
implications for the treatment of individual rights within the currently fashionable economic analysis of law. Specifically, I shall argue that rights cannot be sensibly incorporated within any kind of
maximization framework, and that this conclusion renders suspect
Richard Posner's normative defense of wealth maximization as a
goal for legal systems.
RIGHTS AND THE PARETO PRINCIPLE: SEN VERSUS COASE

Efficiency, as Richard Posner is quick to tell us in his influential
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Western Ontario; Research Associate,
Westminister Institute for Ethics and Human Values. B.A., 1973, Carleton University; Ph.D.,
1979, Cambridge University. This article owes much to criticisms and comments at various
stages of its development. I am particularly grateful to Bruce Ackerman, James Buchanan,
Don Campbell, Charles Plott, and Amartya Sen, and to members of the Law and Economics
Workshop at the University of Toronto Law Faculty. Preparation for this final version received
the support of the Liberty Fund through its Summer Fellowship Programme in Law and Political Economy.
1. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
2. See generally A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970).
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book Economic Analysis of Law, "means exploiting economic resources in such a way that 'value'-human satisfaction as measured
by. aggregate consumer willingness to pay for goods and services-is
3 Coase's major contribution in The Problem of Social
maximized."
Cost 4 is to show that economic efficiency can be attained, in a world
without transaction costs, regardless of how the initial assignment of
rights was made in a conflict over the use of a given resource. For
example, if a factory were polluting the atmosphere at a cost to the
comfort or health of the surrounding homeowners, and if the cost to
the factory owner of shutting down, moving, or installing some kind
of abatement device were greater than the total pollution cost to the
homeowners, then, if the rights were assigned to the homeowners to
be free from pollution, the factory owner would have every incentive
to buy the right from the owners and continue polluting. On the
other hand, if the right to pollute lay with the factory owner, then he
would be unwilling to sell that right (and stop polluting) at a price
that the homeowners would be willing to pay.5 Thus, regardless of
how the right might initially be distributed, the final allocative result, absent income effects, would be the same. Moreover, the result
would be efficient. An analogous result can be obtained for the case
in which the right is less valuable to the factory owner than it is to
the homeowners.
Since, according to Coase, economic efficiency will be obtained
in a world without transaction costs regardless of the initial assignment of rights, it follows that efficiency considerations alone will tell
us little about what the initial assignment of rights should be in such
a world. The way is still open, however, to introduce other considerations, such as those that might derive from more purely rights-based
ethical theories. At this point Sen's theorem becomes important.
Sen claims to have shown that the following two ethical principles are not always consistent with one another given a sufficiently
unrestricted domain of individual preferences. 6 (I) The Pareto principle: If everyone in society prefers some state of affairs x to another
one y, then y should not prevail if x is attainable. (II) The principle
of individual liberty: For each individual in society there are some
3. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10 (2d ed. 1977) (emphasis in original).
4.

Coase, supra note 1.

5. This hypothetical is taken from Coase. Id. at 41.
6.

For the original proof, see A. SEN, supra note 2, at 78-88. For a survey of the recent

literature by economists and philosophers on Sen's problem, see Sen, Liberty. Unanimity and
Rights, 43 EcONOMICA 217, 217 (1976).
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personal matters such that if the privileged individual prefers, say, w
to z, then z should not prevail if w is attainable (e.g., to sleep on
one's back (w) or one's stomach (z), all other things in society being
equal).7
To illustrate his theorem on "the impossibility of a Paretian libertarian,"" Sen asks us to suppose that the book Lady Chatterley's
Lover has just been published and that a single copy is available at
some public library. There are two individuals in society, namely
Prude and Rude, who are contemplating reading the book, and so
there are three possible social states (all other things being equal):
the social state in which neither individual reads the book (o), the
social state in which only Prude reads the book (p), and the social
state in which only Rude reads the book (r). (Since there is only one
copy of the book, it is not possible for both to read it at once.)
Suppose that the two individuals have the following orderings of
the three alternative social states. Prude prefers that no one read the
book, but given that someone must read it, he would prefer that he
read it rather than Rude, since he cannot stand the idea of Rude
gloating over that muck. Thus, Prude's ordering is: o, p, r. Rude
considers the social state in which no one reads the book to be worst,
but agrees with Prude that if only one individual can read the book,
Prude should read it, since Prude will then be exposed to Lawrence's
masterly prose and have his rather narrow literary horizons expanded. Thus, Rude's ordering is: p,r, o.
A libertarian, concerned with the exercise of free choice, would,
according to Sen, choose to assign'the pair of social states (o, p) to
Prude, since this choice only concerns his reading of the book and he
should be allowed to make this choice for himself. Similarly, the libertarian would assign the rightful pair (o, r) to Rude. Thus, on
grounds of individual freedom, since Prude prefers o to p and this
preference involves his own rightful domain of choice, o is declared
socially preferred to p. (Note that this means only that p should not
prevail as the social choice if o is attainable; it does not imply that o
should actually end up being chosen.) Similarly, since Rude prefers r
to o, r is socially preferred to o. However, p is Pareto-superior to r
(and, therefore, socially preferred), revealing a social-preference cycle--o preferred to p,p preferred to r, and r preferred to o. But
7.
8.

Sen, supra note 6, at 217.
Sen originally indicated his theorem as showing the impossibility of a Paretian liberal,

but in a more recent work he has switched to the word "libertarian." Sen, supra note 6, at
218. The Lady Chatterley's Lover hypothetical originates in A. SEN, supra note 2, at 80-82.
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acyclicity, the condition that requires that there not be any such social-preference cycle, is a necessary condition for a chosen alternative to exist, at least if choice is to accord with the ethical principles
proposed by Sen.9 In Sen's example, for instance, if society tries to
choose, as it must, any of the three alternatives, o, p, and r, this
choice will violate either some individual's right or the Pareto principle. The question for Sen and others who are troubled by the theorem is which of the seemingly reasonable principles so far proposed-the Pareto principle, the liberty principle, unrestricted
domain of preferences, or acyclicity-is to be relaxed.
Although the Coase and Sen theorems lie respectively within
the two quite different domains of positive and normative economics,
it is not uncommon for critics of Sen's result to appeal to Coase's
theorem to solve Sen's problem. If transactions are costless, the argument goes, individuals will bargain their way out of the Paretoinferior state of affairs, and such bargains will respect individual
rights. In Sen's own example, for instance, it will be in the interest of
both parties, Prude and Rude, to engineer a trade and arrive at a
contract ensuring that Prude reads the book. Such a trade not only
avoids the Pareto inferiority of having only Rude read the book but
also seemingly does not coerce anyone to read or not to read it
against his or her will.10
Sen has acknowledged this objection but has argued that in a
libertarian world such contracts may not be forthcoming.11 With respect to his own example he has argued that either Prude or Rude
may refuse to enter into such a trade despite utility gain if he is
libertarian enough to see no moral gain in the trade (namely the deal
involving Prude reading a book that he detests to prevent Rude reading it with pleasure).12 Of course, the distinction which Sen wishes to
make between a utility gain and a moral gain raises the spectre of
the revealed preference theorist who will define utility only in terms
of what is chosen, irrespective of why (or on what moral motivation)
it is chosen. Thus, the refusal to trade away from the Pareto-inferior
9. For a discussion of the acyclicity condition in the context of Sen's example, see A.
SEN, supra note 2, at 81-82.

10. For examples of this type of answer to Sen, see SUGDEN, Social Choice and Individual Liberty, in CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (M. Artis & A. Nobay eds. 1978); Gibbard, A Pareto-ConsistentLibertarian Claim, 7 J. ECON. THEORY 388, 397-401 (1974).
11. Sen, PersonalUtilities and Public Judgments: Or What's Wrong With Welfare Economics?, 89 ECON. J. 537, 549-54 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Sen, Personal Utilities];Sen,
Utilitarianism and Welfarism, 76 J. PHILOSOPHY 463, 482 (1979).
12. Sen, Personal Utilities, supra note 11, at 551.
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state of affairs in which Rude reads the book towards one in which
Prude reads it instead serves to show that there actually is no such
utility gain for the reluctant party and thus indicates that the state
of affairs in question is not really Pareto-inferior after all.
Sen's defense of his theorem against the combined attack of the
Coasians and the revealed preference theorists seems to be rather
weak, partly because it is unnecessarily constrained by his own particular example. A different example may better serve to illustrate
his point: Let x be some status quo, and let y be a state of affairs
exactly like the status quo except that in y the exiled Shah of Iran
has contracted with a United States Government hospital for medical care. Suppose in particular that the Shah is dying in x. Let z be
exactly like y except that the Iranian oil producers have agreed to
boycott the United States. Presumably, the United States and the
Shah have the right to contract as they see fit, and the Iranian oil
producers have the right to sell or not to sell their oil when and to
whom they wish. Thus, after the manner of Sen, the rightful partitions are (y, x) for the United States, and (z, y) for the Iranian oil
producers.
The following preference orderings seem reasonable:
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

y

IRAN

x

X

z

z

y

That is, the United States Government prefers a contract with the
Shah for his hospital care to the status quo in which he is dying, but
likes least the idea of suffering an Iranian oil embargo. The Iranians
prefer most the status quo in which the Shah is dying for lack of
proper care, but choose to have an oil embargo given that the United
States chooses to treat the Shah. The result is that if the United
States rightfully chooses y over x, then Iran will rightfully choose z
over y, and so z, the Pareto-inferior alternative, 13 prevails as the social choice.
This scenario and its outcome roughly parallel Sen's original example in which Prude refuses to rush to the library to read the book
he dislikes and Rude ends up reading it instead. Just as in that case,
13.

The Shah clearly prefers z to y, and so z is not, strictly speaking, Pareto-inferior. I

have chosen, however, to ignore the Shah's preferences in this example since I am more concerned with the revealed preference theorist than with the Pareto principle: What preference is
revealed by the United States' reluctance to trade?
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however, there may be a Coasian contract in the offing. It seems
likely, for example, that Iran might make the following offer: Cease
treating the Shah and we shall restore the status quo oil supplies,
that is, an offer to restore the status quo x over the prevailing
Pareto-inferior state of affairs z.
Suppose, as seems likely, that the United States Government
would refuse to make such a contract. Does this imply that the
United States prefers z to x, the status quo? Surely not, for that
suggests that the United States would actually prefer an oil embargo
over the status quo so lonj as the United States also got a chance to
treat the Shah!' 4 A more reasonable interpretation seems to be that
although the United States does prefer the status quo x to the state
of affairs z as an outcome, it is not prepared on principle to actually
enter into a contract (i.e., to be part of the means) to see the status
quo x restored. Indeed, it seems quite possible that, although the
United States would not choose to move out of x if it thought z
might be the eventual result, if it actually were in z it would not act
(i.e., contract) so as to move out of z and back to x. It will be argued
in later sections of this paper 5 that this concern for- how (i.e., the
process by which) a state of affairs is chosen over another has serious
implications both for the conventional models of economic rationality
and for certain proposed models of individual rights.
For the moment, however, it is enough to suggest that there
seems to be something in Sen's theorem which resists the quick solution of either a Coasian or a revealed preference theorist. Nor should
we be surprised by this-at least if we stand back for a moment
from the particularities of the various examples and consider what
Sen is actually saying. It is well known that for an individual's right
to be taken seriously, it must be able to resist the recommendations
of either a utilitarian calculus or a calculation of largest net social
benefit, at least in some instances."8 If an individual's right was sacrificed every time it was convenient for a utilitrian recommendation
to do so, then the right would have no separate and independent existence of its own, being subject to the overall calculus of largest net
14. The die-hard welfare economist will invoke long-run welfare considerations to explain the United States' short-run reluctance to trade. Analogous examples, however, can be
found where the reluctance to trade "on principle" results in the reluctant party's own death

(i.e., where the long run is very short indeed). For historical examples, see generally D.
DAUnE, COLLABORATION WITH TYRANNY IN RABBINIC LAW

(1965).

15. See text accompanying notes 46-97 infra.
16. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY at xi, 172 (1977).
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benefit. What Sen has shown is that individual rights may not only
be sufficiently important to frustrate the more intense interests of
others not holding the right (perhaps even a majority),'but also that
the exercise of those rights, important for their own sake, may lead
to outcomes which make us all worse off than we might otherwise be.
Consider, for example, the standard prisoner's dilemma in which it is
well known that there is a danger of a Pareto-inferior outcome, but
in which it might also be thought important that the prisoners have a
right to decide, on their own and independent of a contract, whether
to confess or not.17 Or think of a quite usual definition of paternalism in which an individual's right to autonomous action is traded off
against his or her own welfare.18 What Sen suggests by way of his
theorem is that we might choose a less paternalistic society even
though the exercise of our autonomy might make us all worse off
than we would be were we not allowed the relevant freedoms. Thus,
the Pareto principle may not be so very sacred after all--certainly
not sufficient, but probably not even necessary-either as a normative criterion, -or even as a descriptive aid as to how people might
behave in a world without transaction costs.
THE MAXIMIZATION THESIS

Although the remarks of the previous section suggest my general sympathy with the thrust of Sen's theorem as opposed to the
Coasian response, Sen's use of one of the usual collective rationality
conditions from social choice theory arguably makes a nonsense of
his own concern for individual rights. By showing the particular
form that a relaxation of these conditions must take, I hope to gain
some better insight into a more appropriate model of individual
rights. To accomplish this, a brief discussion of some fundamentals
of social choice theory is in order.
Formally, we might characterize the general problem of social
choice in the following way: Let us refer to the set of descriptions of
possible states of the world as alternative social states (or states of
affairs) and call this set A. At any one time it seems likely that only
some subset of A will actually be available for choice; call this the
17.

For a good exposition of the prisoner's dilemma, see R. LucE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES
(1957).
18. E.g., Dworkin, Paternalism,in MORALITY AND THE LAW 107, 108 (R. Wasserstrom
ed. 1971). Dworkin defines paternalism as "the interference with a person's liberty of action
justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or
values of the person being coerced." Id.
AND DEciSiONS 94-95
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attainableset and denote it by the letter S, where S 9 A. The lower
case letters x, y, z will denote individual social states and thus will
be the objects of choice in some attainable set S. Let C(S) represent
the chosen set from the set S. Of course, C(S) is a subset of S.
The problem of social choice is to move from the set S to the set
C(S). For this we need choice criteria, or reasonable conditions for
social choice. According to the conventions of social choice theory,
the attainable set S, the chosen set C(S), and the conditions for social choice are all normally related in the following way: A social
state x of S will be chosen-will be in C(S)-if and only if there is
no y of S which is preferred to x according to the conditions for
social choice, whatever they may be. Conversely, a social state x of S
will not be chosen if and only if there is a y of S which is preferred
to x according to the relevant choice criteria. In symbols, and denoting the above-mentioned relation "is preferred to" by the letter P,
the social choice theorist's definition of a chosen element, designated
as (1), is written:
(1) xE C(S) if and only if xE S and for no yE S, yPx.' 9
It should be made clear that C(S) need not contain just one
social state. For example, if S is the set (x, y) and neither x is preferred to y nor y is preferred to x, then C(S) is equal to the set (x,
y). Choices between members of C(S) can be made randomly. More
important, however, is that to ensure that C(S) exists (i.e., is not
empty), assuming it is defined as (1) above, it is necessary that the
social-preference relation P satisfy the collective rationality property,
acyclicity (i.e., if x1 Px2, x 2Px3, . ., Xn-Pxn, then not xnPxl). If
this was not the case, ihei for any alteriiative which wag chosen,
there would always be some other alternative in the attainable set
which would be preferred to it, and this would contradict (1).20
Now (1) seems to be a reasonable way to define the elements of
the chosen set C(S), and, indeed, the above definition seems to be at
least as old as the Marquis de Condorcet. After all, why should we
choose some alternative social state if there is another alternative
social state which is preferred according to our own choice criteria?
Nevertheless, Thomas Schwartz has criticized (1) for being too ambitious and, in particular, for being a "maximizing" notion of
.

19. Both this notation and the definition of a chosen alternative are standard form in
social choice theory. See, e.g., K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 15
(1963); A. SEN, supra note 2, at 10.
20. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
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choice. 1 According to (1), x can be chosen only if it is better than,
or at least as good as, every other alternative in the attainable set.
Call this the maximization thesis. Schwartz has proposed instead
that x should be chosen if and only if x is an element of S and for no
y of S, which is not chosen, is y preferred to x according to the
relevant choice criteria. In symbols, the Schwartz definition of a chosen element, designated as (2), is written:
(2) x E C(S) if and only if x E S and for no y E (S - C(S)), yPx.'2
In other words, x may be chosen even if y is preferred to x (i.e., even
if there is a better alternative) so long as y is also chosen. It is this
possibility which seems to pull against the idea of maximization.
In criticizing the maximization thesis of social choice, Schwartz
is in good company. A number of philosophers, including John
Rawls 2a and Bernard Williams,2 have argued that the concept of
maximizing is closely tied up with a very particular type of ethical
theory, namely consequentialism, which holds that the rightness of
any given action is to be determined only by the goodness of its results. 25 Given some notion of "good," notions of "better" (preferred)
and "best" (most preferred) quite naturally follow. Yet, other kinds
of ethical theory,26 and in particular deontological theories, 27 put the
"right" before the "good," maintaining that the rightness of an action or process can, at least sometimes, be determined by the nature
of the action or process itself. The question of its consequences need
not arise at all.28 Moreover, this argument contends that what is
right or just or fair is not equally subject to maximization as the illformed comparatives, "righter" or "more right," and the superlatives, "rightest" and "most right" suggest. It should also be noted
that concerns for individual rights are usually thought to be bound
up with deontological rather than consequentialist ethical theories.29
21. See Schwartz, Rationality and the Myth of the Maximum, 6 NoOs 97 (1972).
22. Strictly speaking, Schwartz also requires that no non-empty proper subset of C(S)
should satisfy (2). That is, if we can discard some inferior alternatives from C(S) without
reducing C(S) to the null set, we should do so. Id.
23. J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSCE 24-25 (1971).
24. Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism,in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 75;

85-86 (1973).
25. Id.at 85.
26.
27.
28.
29.
note 24,

Id. at 87.
Id.
Id.
R. NoziCK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28-30, 153-66 (1974); Williams, supra
at 88-89. The reader may recognize that the distinction between consequentialism and
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Thus, according to Schwartz, to decide in favour of the first rather
than the second characterization of social choice is to decide in favour of maximization.3 0 Then, according to philosophers such as
Rawls and Williams, the decision to maximize implies choosing consequentialist over deontological principles.31 Why this second step
must be so is not made clear. Can one not maximize according to
deontological principles so that if some alternative y is preferred to
another alternative x according to those principles, then x should not
be chosen if y is attainable? Indeed, isn't this precisely what Sen
tries to do with his liberty principle? The answer to the former question seems to be a guarded yes. It must be emphasized, however,
that to maximize according to deontological principles is to maximize over a social-preference relation which does not link descriptions of social states: If the social-preference relation does hold between social states, and even if this relation reflects some apparent
deontological concern for individual rights and liberties, then, if the
maximization thesis holds, we are well on our way to ensuring that
the final social choice from the attainable set will be quite independent of the choice process, if it exists at all. This independence obviously contradicts deontology which is concerned with the rightness of
the process (or action) by which final results (or consequences) are
achieved. In the next two sections I shall show exactly why this is so,
first by connecting maximization to the collective rationality condition, acyclicity,3 2 and second, by connecting acyclicity to the property of path independence-a property, I shall argue, which makes a
nonsense of both choice sequences or processes and of individual
rights and liberties. 33
MAXIMIZATION AND AcYCLICITY

To see why deontology and the maximization thesis are at odds
with one another, we should recall that acyclicity is a necessary condition for ensuring that the set C(S) exists, assuming it is defined as
(1) above. Again, acyclicity requires of the attainable alternatives
that if xPx2, x2Px3, . . . xn-.Px n, then not XnPx I. If this was not
the case, then for any alternative which was chosen there would aldeontology has much in common with
historical principles of justice.
30. See text accompanying notes
31. See text accompanying notes
32. See text accompanying notes
33. See text accompanying notes

the distinction Nozick makes between patterned and
21-22
23-26
34-37
38-53

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol10/iss2/7
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ways be some other alternative in the attainable set which would be
preferred to it, and this would contradict (1).
Acyclicity, of course, is a rationality property of the social-preference relation." Blair and his coauthors have shown, however, that
acyclicity is equivalent in choice-theoretic terms to the conjunction
of two specific Conditions, namely the Generalized Condorcet condition (GC) and the Chernoff condition (C).3 5 Condition GC requires
that if an alternative x of S is at least as good as every other attainable alternative according to the choice criteria, then x must be
among the chosen elements from that set. In symbols, and denoting
the relation "is at least as good as" by the symbol R,
GC: If x G S,and xRy for all y of S,then x E C(S).
An example should help to illustrate this point. Suppose we are trying to determine who is the best musical composer of all time. According to condition GC, if Mozart is at least as good as every other
composer we know, then he at least is one of the best composers of
all time. Condition C requires that if some alternatives are chosen
from some attainable set S 1, and the attainable set is narrowed down
to a subset S 2, which still contains some previously chosen alternatives, then none of the previously chosen alternatives should become
unchosen in a choice from that subset. In symbols,
C: If S2CS 1 then (C(S 1)n (S2))__ C(S 2), for all sets S1, S2.

To continue our example, condition C states that if Mozart and Bach
are the best composers of all time, then Mozart and Bach are certain
to be chosen as among the best composers of the eighteenth century.
It is worth noting that condition C is a contraction-consistency
property of choice. That is, it is concerned with keeping a chosen
alternative chosen as the attainable set is contracted (by dropping
other alternatives). Condition GC, on the other hand, is an expansion-consistency property of choice. In particular, in the larger set it
keeps the alternative chosen which is at least as good as, or chosen
when compared with, every other attainable alternative in that set.
This way of characterizing the two conditions will prove useful for
our later discussion.36
34. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
35.

Blair, Bordes, Kelly & Suzumura, Impossibility Theorems Without Collective Ra-

tionality, 13 J.ECON.
36.

THEORY

361, 367-69 (1976) (Theorem 2) [hereinafter cited as Blair].

For a discussion of choice consistency conditions (like C and GC) in these terms, see

Sen, Social Choice Theory: A Reexamination, 45
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Now, it is easy to see that condition GC will not distinguish (1),
the maximization thesis, from (2), Schwartz's definition of a chosen
element. This is because condition GC only ensures that the alternative, say y, which is at least as good as every other attainable alternative, is among the alternatives from the chosen set. It could still be
that an alternative x is chosen from the set S even if y is the unique
choice from the pair (x, y), that is, even if y is shown to be preferred
to x. This would violate maximization. If we are to ensure maximization we must therefore look to the second of the two conditions
which together define acyclicity, namely condition C. This condition,
although already presented as a contraction-consistency property for
the inclusion of chosen alternatives, can be reformulated in terms of
its contrapositive as an expansion-consistency property for the exclusion of unchosen alternatives. That is, if x is in S 2, but does not
belong to C(S), then it does not belong to C(Sl) when S2 is a subset
of S1.37 Looked at this way, it is easy to see why condition C is the
maximizing condition in acyclicity: If y was the unique choice from
the pair (x, y), indicating yPx, then, according to condition C, it
could not be that x belongs to C(S) for a larger set S containing both
x and y. This, of course, would be in keeping with maximization.
Having isolated the maximizing feature of acyclicity in choicetheoretic terms, it remains to make the connection with deontology.
This we shall do by looking at the property of path independence, a
property best introduced by examining the familiar paradox of majority voting.
PATH INDEPENDENCE, ACYCLICITY, AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

Suppose there is a committee of three individuals considering
three alternatives. Each individual ranks the alternatives (in order of
preference from left to right) in the following way:
Individual 1: x
Individual 2: z
Individual 3: y

y
x
z

z
y
x

It is easy to see that each alternative has spme other alternative preferred to it by a majority of two to one: x is so preferred to y, y to z,
and z to x, a violation of acyclicity. Since a majority can do nothing
but choose a minority-preferred alternative, this is often referred to
37. It is easily demonstrated that this is the equivalent of C above. Suppose some x of S2
did belong to C(S,), but not to C(S 2) where S2 S1. A chosen alternative from the superset S,
has then become unchosen in the subset S2 , a violation of condition C.
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as the paradox of majority voting.38
Suppose this committee, either as a time saver or because it is
following Robert's Rules of Order,3 9 imposed the condition that any
alternative defeated by a majority should be eliminated from any
further consideration. If the individual preferences were as assumed
above, this condition would make the final social choice entirely dependent upon the sequence in which the alternatives were considered. We shall call this property path dependence. In our hypothetical, for example, the final social choice would always be that
alternative which was not considered first. If the committee had
voted first on x against y, x would have been majority-preferred, but
z would have defeated x in the next round. Similar results can be
obtained for any other sequence. The dependency of the final choice
on the sequence of consideration, or on the choice path, allows the
person deciding the order in which the alternatives are presented (for
example, the committee chairman) to bias the voting in favour of
any one of the three alternatives. In general, it might be observed
that the later an alternative enters the voting, the greater its chance
of adoption.
The idea of path independence was first introduced into the social choice literature by Kenneth Arrow,40 but recently it has been
discussed more fully by Charles Plott.41 According to Plott,
the process of choosing, from a dynamic point of view, frequently
proceeds in a type of "divide and conquer" manner. The alternatives are "split up" into smaller sets, a choice is made over each of
these sets, the chosen elements are collected, and then a choice is
made from them. Path independence, in this case, would mean that
the final result would be independent of the way the alternatives
were initially divided up for consideration."
In symbols, path independence can be represented as,
Pl: C(SIUS 2)

=

C(C(S 1)UC(S 2)) for all sets S1, S2.

Thus, according to PI, in choosing from a set, say (x, y, z), it should
make no difference to the final result whether a choice is first exercised over the pair (xy), or the pair (xz), or the pair (yz), with the
38. K. ARROW, supra note 19, at 2; A. SEN, supra note 2, at 38.
39.
40.

ROBERT'S RULES OF ORDER §§ 43-44 (newly rev. ed. 1970).
K. ARROW, supra note 19, at 120.

41. Plott, Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice, 41 EcONOMETRICA 1075
(1973).
42. Id. at 1079-80.
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winner in the first pair to be compared with the only remaining alternative. In other words, the final social choice is to be independent
of the choice sequence or process.
This appears, however, to strike rather hard at deontology. The
very point of deontological thinking is to take choice processes or
sequences seriously. Moreover, if we want to afford individual rights
any serious consideration, then PI becomes a rather suspect property. To see why this is so, it is instructive to reconsider Sen's original example to illustrate the impossibility of a Paretian libertarian.4
Recall that Sen argued that a libertarian would partition the set
of the three alternatives (op,r) into the two sets (op) and (or), assigning the first partition to Prude and the second to Rude on the
basis of freedom to choose over a personal domain. Sen then went on
to show that the exercise of these rights might violate the Pareto
principle." But there is a more fundamental point: If we were to
impose PI on the method of social choice (when the social choice in
this case would be made up of the choices of the individuals), then,
according to that property, it should not matter whether these
choices were exercised over the pairs (op) and (or). They could just
as easily have been divided up (op) and (p,r), or (or) and (pr), or
even (op,r) and (o). The result, according to PI, should be the same.
In other words, given P, the rightful domain of individual choice is,
quite literally, inconsequential. This would not evidence a very serious concern for individual rights.
Sen, however, does not require PI to prove his particular theorem. Indeed, all Sen does impose on his method of social choice is
acyclicity, since he is concerned only with satisfying the maximization thesis.45 Nevertheless, it is instructive to consider that had Sen
required the only slightly stronger collective rationality property,
quasi-transitivity"'(i.e., if x 1Px 2, x 2 Px 3 . . . xn.lPXn then xlPxn),

then he would have implicitly imposed PI on his liberal method of
making social choices, since that rationality property implies P1.
This becomes evident once we examine the definition of both quasitransitivity and PI in choice-theoretic terms.
Plott and Blair have shown that quasi-transitivity of the socialpreference relation is equivalent in choice-theoretic terms to the conjunction of three conditions, namely, the Generalized Condorcet con43.
44.
45.
46.

A. SEN, supra note 2, at 80.
See text accompanying notes 6-9 supra.
A. SEN, supra note 2, at 87-88.
Id. at 15.
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dition (GC), the Chernoff condition (C), and a superset condition
(S).'4 The first two of these conditions have already been defined
above. Condition S requires that if S 2 is a subset of S, then the
chosen set from S, should not be a proper subset of the chosen set
from S 2.49 In symbols,
S: If S2 CS 1 then C(S1 )

C(S2) for all sets S1, S2.

Again, by way of example, condition S states that if Mozart and
Bach are (equally) the best composers of the eighteenth century,
then it should not be that just Mozart is the best composer of all
time (although it may be that just Mozart and Brahms are).
Blair and his coauthors have also shown that PI is equivalent to
the conjunction of the two conditions C and S.50 Thus, PI is weaker
than quasi-transitivity since it does not imply condition GC, but obviously quasi-transitivity implies PI. Therefore, if the imposition of
PI on a method of making a social choice makes a nonsense of a
rightful domain of individual choice, then a fortiori the imposition of
quasi-transitivity must have the same result.
Sen, however, does not impose quasi-transitivity on his liberal
method of social choice, and so one might legitimately wonder
whether the preceding discussion is relevant. Before jumping to this
conclusion, however, we should consider the following question: If PI
makes a nonsense of deontology in general, and of a rightful domain
of individual choice in particular, which of the choice-theoretic conditions, C or S, which together define PI, should be relaxed?
The arguments of the last two sections seem to suggest that condition C is the prime candidate to be relaxed because condition C is
common both to PI and to acyclicity. Acyclicity, it will be recalled,
is a necessary condition for C(S) to exist, given the maximization
thesis,"1 but Rawls and others have argued that maximization is a
consequentialist, and not a deontological notion.52 Of course, one
could relax condition S and thus, in relaxing PI, leave acyclicity
(and Sen's theorem) intact. This, however, would still leave Rawls'
deontological objections to maximization unexplained. Moreover, it
is difficult to see how one might interpret a relaxation of condition S.
47. Blair, supra note 35, at 366 (Theorem 1); Plott, supra note 41, at 1085 (Theorem
3).
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
Blair, supra note 35, at 365.
Id. at 366 (Theorem 1).
See text accompanying note 20 supra.
See text accompanying notes 23-28 supra.
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Why would a choice from a superset be strictly contained in a choice
from its own subset? On the other hand, a reasonable interpretation
of a relaxation of condition C is available. 53 Moreover, it will be argued in the next two sections that this interpretation makes some
sense both of procedural justice and of the often discussed distinction
between positive and negative rights.
CHOICE HIERARCHIES

Ronald Dworkin refers to two kinds of ordering within the law,
one horizontal and the other vertical. 54 The horizontal ordering ensures that the principles justifying a decision at one level are consis55
tent with the justification offered for other decisions at that level.
The vertical ordering, on the other hand, "is provided by distinguishing layers of authority; that is, layers at which official decisions
might be taken to be controlling over decisions made at lower
levels."' 56 According to Dworkin, an obvious example of such a vertical ordering is the constitutional government of the United States:
The constitutional structure occupies the highest level, the decisions of the Supreme Court and perhaps other courts interpreting
that structure the next, enactments of various legislatures the next
and decisions of the various courts developing the common law different levels below that. [A judge] must arrange justification of
principle at each of these levels so that the justification is consistent57
with principles taken to provide the justification of higher levels.
The idea of a hierarchy of decisionmaking powers is not uncommon in legal theory; some form of it is contained in Kelsen's hierarchy of norms, 58 in Hart's distinction between primary and secondary
rules,5 9 in Hohfeld's separation of rights from powers, 60 and even in
Austin's belief that the sovereign is subject to constitutional constraint.6 1 Ignoring here the important question whether unconstitutional should be identified with unlawful, or whether, as Austin argued, constitutional law is "positive morality merely,"'6 2 it is
53.
54.
55.

See text accompanying notes 54-57 infra.
R. DWORKIN, supra note 16, at 117.
Id.

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. H. KELSEN, PURE
59.

60.
61.
62.

THEORY OF LAW

§ 35 (1967).

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77-96 (1961).
W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1964).
J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 257-64 (2d ed. 1970).
Id. at 259.
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instructive to consider how such a constitutional hierarchy might be
interpreted in social choice terms.
To begin, it is important to consider what is meant when we say
that certain choices are "constrained by" or "consistent with"
choices or decisions made at higher levels. It should be apparent that
it is not sufficient to say only that lower level choice authorities have
a different jurisdiction than higher level choice authorities. This
would not justify the use of the term hierarchy, nor would it explain
why the constraints do not operate equally well in both directions, up
and down. There must, therefore, be some sense in which the choices
made at lower levels are dependent upon the choices made at higher
levels, and not vice versa, so that had the choices at the higher levels
been different, the range of alternatives from which lower level
choice authorities must make their choice would not have been the
same.
Choice at any level involves separating chosen from unchosen
alternatives. Therefore, if choice at some lower level is to be dependent upon that first or higher level's choice, it must either choose so
that previously chosen alternatives are no longer chosen, or choose so
that previously unchosen alternatives become chosen. It should be
emphasized that the lower level choice authority cannot do both: If it
could both unchoose that which was previously chosen, as well as
choose that which was previously unchosen, then the lower level
choice authority would not be constrained at all, and the whole idea
of a choice hierarchy would be a nonsense. Similarly, it cannot be
the case that the lower level choice authority must neither unchoose
that which was previously chosen, nor choose that which was previously unchosen, for if that were true, the lower level authority would
have no real choice at all; the very idea of a choice hierarchy would
become absurd.
It should be noted that the latter realization has immediate implications for the strongest of the collective rationality conditions of
the economic theory of social choice-full transitivity of the socialpreference relation. It will be recalled from the previous section that
quasi-transitivity requires that if x is socially preferred to y, and y is
socially preferred to z, then x is socially preferred to z. Full transitivity imposes the stronger requirement that if x is at least as good
as y (i.e., x is socially preferred or indifferent to y), and y is at least
as good as z, then x is at least as good as z. That is, where quasitransitivity requires transitivity only of strict social preferences, full
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transitivity requires transitivity of social indifference as well.63 Arrow has shown that full transitivity of the social-preference relation
is equivalent to the following choice-theoretic condition," referred to
by Kotaro Suzumura as the Arrowian condition.65 In symbols, the
condition can be represented,

AC: If S2 CS1 and S2 fC(Si) -,
for all sets S1, S2 .

then (C(SI)fS 2)

=

C(S2)

In words, condition AC requires that if some alternatives are chosen
out of a set S 1, and the range of alternatives is narrowed down to a
subset S2, a set which still contains some previously chosen alternatives, then no previously chosen alternative should become unchosen
and no previously unchosen alternative should become chosen. Thus,
by requiring full transitivity of the social-preference relation, an
economist would immediately preclude the possibility of a constitutional hierarchy of the very sort we have described above.*
To make sense of a hierarchy of choice, lower level choice authorities must either choose from previously unchosen alternatives, or
unchoose previously chosen alternatives, but not both. The question
becomes: Which of the two powers is the more reasonable for lower
level choice authorities? Do such authorities generally have (1) the
right to choose fromjpreviously chosen alternatives, leaving previously unchosen alternatives alone, or (2) the right to choose from
previously unchosen alternatives, leaving previously chosen alternatives alone? It seems clear enough that the former is the usual interpretation. That is, lower level choice authorities are generally prevented from making certain choices by higher level authorities; they
are not required by those same authorities to make particular
choices.
If this correctly describes the power of lower level choice authorities, then the choice condition which partially defines both path
independence and acyclicity, namely condition C, must be relaxed,
since condition C requires that chosen alternatives from a set S
should remain chosen in a subset of S if the subset contains some
previously chosen alternatives. 66 This is precisely the requirement
63.
64.

K. ARROW, supra note 19, at 13; A. SEN, supra note 2, at 8.
Arrow, Rational Choice Functions and Orderings, 26 ECONOMICA 121, 123-24

(1959).
65.

Suzumura, Remarks on the Theory of Collective Choice, 43 ECONOMICA 381, 381

(1976).
66. See text accompanying notes 34-53 supra.
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that a concession to powers of form (1) would tend to violate. Therefore, it would appear that a constitutional hierarchy of decisionmaking not only represents a rejection of full transitivity, as argued
above, but also requires the relaxation of the weakest collective-rationality condition-acyclicity. Since acyclicity is a necessary condition for the maximization thesis to hold, it follows that under a constitutional hierarchy we can no longer be maximizing over a social
preference relation which links social states. Moreover, as already
remarked, the relaxation of condition C also undermines path independence. Thus, the constitutional procedure, or sequence of choice,
appears to make sense of Rawls' close identification of deontology
67
with the failure to maximize.
The possibility of making this connection through constitutional
considerations should not surprise those who are familiar with
Rawls' own theory of justice as fairness. Consider these remarks
with which Rawls begins the second part of his influential book:
"[M]y aim is to illustrate the content of the principles of justice. I
shall do this by describing a basic structure that satisfies these principles and by examining the duties and obligations to which they
give rise. The main institutions of this structure are those of a constitutional democracy." 6 8 Later in the book Rawls speaks more generally of the basic structure of his theory:
[T]he contrast between a teleological [consequentialist] theory and
the contract doctrine may be expressed in the following intuitive
way: the former defines the good locally, for example, as a more or
less homogeneous quality or attribute of experience, and regards it
as an extensive magnitude which is to be maximized over some
totality; whereas the latter moves in the opposite fashion by indentifying a sequence of increasinglyspecific structuralforms of right
conduct each set within the preceding one, and in this manner
workingfrom a generalframeworkfor the whole to a sharperand
sharperdeterminationof its parts. Hedonistic ultilitarianism is the
classical instance of the first procedure and illustrates it with compelling simplicity. Justice as fairness exemplifies the second possibility. Thus the four-stage sequence (§ 31) formulates an order of
agreements and enactments designed to build up in several steps a
hierarchical structure of principles, standards, and rules, which
when consistently appliedand adhered to, lead to a definite consti67.

See text accompanying note 23 supra.

68. J. RAwLS, supra note 23, at 195.
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tution for social action. "

Unfortunately, a full and fair exposition of Rawls' basic structure would take us too far from the present argument. It must suffice
to say that Rawls' theory of constitutional democracy is similar in
form to Dworkin's idea of a vertical ordering in law. Yet this, by
itself, says little about the exact nature of individual rights in either
theory. This we shall discuss in the next section.
Before turning to that discussion, however, it is worth commenting on a recent contribution by Gerald Kramer, a social choice theorist, to the debate on due process.70 Kramer contrasts two types of
choice procedure, labeling them parliamentary71 and judicial7 2 respectively. In the first kind of procedure it is characteristic that
"every last division [choice] is between the status quo X and some
proposal." 73 For example, if a member of parliament proposes some
change A, and another member suggests an amendment B to that
change, then the first vote typically takes place between the initial
proposal and its amendment-between A and B. The second vote is
between the status quo X and whichever of A or B survived the first
vote. Kramer contrasts this kind of procedure with the judicial procedure used in a criminal court for determining the verdict and sentence for a defendant.7 4 Typically, the court proceeds first by determining the defendant's guilt or innocence, and then, given a verdict
of guilty, by deciding on an appropriate sentence. Thus, severe or
lenient sentences are never compared with the do nothing or status
quo alternative (i.e., finding the defendant innocent). Kramer, much
like the Queen who said to Alice at the trial, "No! No!. ....
Sentence first-verdict afterwards!" 75 obviously favours the parliamentary over the judicial procedure, since only the former satisfies
condition C, which, as argued above, is necessary for any kind of
rational choice procedure, at least within the conventions of social
choice theory.78 It seems plausible, however, to argue that the idea of
69. Id. at 566 (emphasis added).
70.

Kramer, Some Procedural Aspects of Majority Rule, in DUE PROcEss 264 (J.

Chapman & J. Pennoch eds. 1977).
71. Id. at 282-85.
72. Id. at 281-85. Kramer actually calls judicial procedure sequential procedure, but he
uses judicial procedure as an example of a sequential procedure.
73. Id. at 285.
74. Id. at 281-82.
75. L. CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND 96 (D. Gray ed. 1971).
76. Kramer is quite explicit on this subject. The judicial procedure is declared inadmissible because it fails to satisfy condition C. Kramer, supra note 70, at 285. To see how condition
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proper procedure might somehow be bound up with deciding first a
defendant's verdict and then his sentence, the demands of economic
rationality notwithstanding. Kramer's attraction towards the parliamentary procedure in preference to due process may be explained in
part by the conventions of rational social choice, but also perhaps by
the natural proclivity of a consequentialist to prefer knowing what
the final result will be before committing himself or herself to any
proposed change. This discussion does not show that Kramer is
wrong in his approach, only that his analytical tools commit him
more than he might think to a very particular view of proper choice.
THE NATURE OF HIGHER ORDER INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

In the last section I argued that higher level choice authorities
in a constitutional hierarchy restrain lower level choice authorities
by preventing certain alternatives from being chosen at the lower
level. I also argued, however, that if the lower level choice authorities were to have some choosing of their own to do, then it could not
generally be that the alternatives actually chosen at the higher level
would remain chosen at the lower level. This must mean, therefore,
that higher level choices are, to some extent at least, choices between
lotteries-choices between alternative bundles in which there is more
than one possible final outcome. The final outcome within a chosen
bundle is determined only at the lowest level. 7
At this point it will be useful to introduce some common definitions in economic theory. Economists say that if our choice leads
invariably to a single specific outcome, we are choosing under conditions of certainty. If our choice, on the other hand, leads to more
C is violated in the usual judicial procedure, suppose that there are three possible final outcomes: a finding of innocence (I); a verdict of guilty with a severe sentence (S); and a verdict
of guilty with a lenient sentence (L). Thus, the choice is from a set of outcomes (I,SL). The
first level decision to find the defendant guilty is, however, represented C(ISL) = (SL), and
the second level decision in favour of a lenient sentence is represented C(SL) = L, a violation
of condition C. Were the court to decide the sentence first-for example, by choosing over the
set (SL) and then follow by choosing over either the set (1.S) or (I,L) depending upon which
of S or L was chosen first-condition C would not be violated. This explains Kramer's sympathy with the parliamentary procedure. Moreover, had Kramer required that the procedure
generate a fully (or even quasi) transitive ordering over the set (.S,1L), then the partition may
not even have been (SL) first. It could just as easily have been (1,S) or (1LL). The result
should be the same, since path independence would be implied. Id. at 281-82.
77. Cf. Ramachandra, Liberalism,Non-Binary Choice and the ParetoPrinciple,3 THEoRY & DECISION 49, 52-53 (1972): "At the first [i.e., the highest] level, the problem is choice
of a 'Constitution.' The domain of the [social choice rule] here will be various alternatives
which are bundles of several policies . . . . The outcome of the first-stage decides the domain
of the [social choice rule] in the second stage."
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than one possible outcome, it is said that this choice is from a position of uncertainty. 8 If, however, our choice leads to a set of possible
outcomes, with each outcome occurring with a known probability,
economists say that we are choosing under conditions of risk.7 9 Thus,
in these terms, choices at a higher level in the constitutional hierarchy are choices in the face of either risk or uncertainty. Indeed, only
choices at the lowest level in the hierarchy can be certain choices,
since it is only at this level that the final outcome is uniquely determined. As I shall now argue, this realization leads to an interesting
characterization of individual rights according to Dworkin's liberal
theory of law.
Dworkin thinks of rights as "political trumps held by individuals." 80 Individuals have rights when a collective goal or policy, such
as economic efficiency or a more equal distribution of wealth, "is not
a sufficient justification for denying them what they wish, as individuals, to have or to do, or [is] not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or injury upon them." 81 Dworkin's belief that individual rights, can only be taken seriously when consequentialist
doctrines are set aside is evidenced by his reference to "state of affairs" in the following passage:
[S]ome state of affairs is a goal within a particular political theory
if it counts in favor of a political act, within that theory, that the
act will advance or preserve that state of affairs, and counts against
an act that it will retard or threaten it. .

.

.[But] an individual

has a right to a particular political act, within a political theory, if
the failure to provide that act, when he calls for it, would be unjusof the theory would, on
tified within that theory even if the goals
62
the balance, be disserviced by that act.

Dworkin even goes so far as to say that the strength of a particular
right is measured by the degree of its disservice to the goal in question. 83 It should be apparent, therefore, that in terms of the constitutional hierarchy, or Dworkin's own vertical ordering, rights constrain
goals and not vice versa."
If, however, individual rights are higher in the constitutional hi78.

See, e.g., H. GREEN, CONSUMER THEORY 213 (1976).

79.

Id.

80.

R. DWORKIN, supra note 16, at xi.

81.

Id.

82.

Id. at 169 (emphasis in original).

83. Id.
84. For a similar view, see R. NozIcK, supra note 29, at 28-30, 164-66.
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erarchy than either policies or goals, then it follows from the above
arguments that the exercise of rights must be likened to choice in the
face of uncertainty or risk. Rightful choices cannot be said to secure
specific final outcomes for individuals because the specifics are left
up to the lower level choice authorities. One might ask, therefore,
what a right does for an individual. The answer is that a right
secures the individual against specific final outcomes. Given the exercise of the individual's higher order right, certain alternatives are not
choosable at the lower goal-based level.
It may appear that we have introduced a rather arbitrary asymmetry into the discussion. Why should the exercise of a right secure
an individual against particular outcomes, but not as easily secure
particular outcomes for the individual? In fact, this asymmetry follows necessarily from the argument as it has thus far been presented.
That is, it follows from the nature of a constitutional hierarchy and
from Dworkin's concern for ordering individual rights above collective goals. Although the exercise of a higher order right can be a
choice only between alternative bundles of outcomes, all the particular outcomes of an unchosen bundle must nevertheless remain unchosen at the lower level. Thus, the individual, by choosing appropriately at the higher level, can, with certainty, secure himself against
quite specific final outcomes. He cannot, however, by making the appropriate choice, actually ensure that any particular outcome is the
final social choice: That would leave nothing for the lower level
choice authority to do, and would therefore make a nonsense of a
constitutional hierarchy.
It will be instructive to attempt a characterization of the right
described above in Hohfeldian terms.85 For convenience of exposition
we shall speak of an individual's higher order constitutional right
and of the lower level choice of a legislature. Assume that an individual has a constitutional right to choose over the set of three alternatives (x,y,z). Because the lower level legislature must generally
have some choosing of its own to do, we shall assume that A has to
choose between the bundle (xy) and the single alternative (z). Suppose A chooses (xy), leaving the final choice over this bundle to the
legislature. In Hohfeldian terms, we then can say that A has the
right that z not be chosen at the legislative level, and that the legislature has a correlative duty not to so choose. A, however, has no
right that either x or y not be chosen at the legislative level, and so
85.

W.

HOHFELD,

supra note 60.
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the legislature has the correlative liberty to make either of these two
choices.86 It is also worth noting that had A chosen differently at the
constitutional level, then the legislature's liberties and duties would
not have been the same. In Hohfeldian terms, we speak of A's power
to change the legal obligations of the legislature and of the legislatures correlative liability to have its obligations so changed. Since
the legislature, however, cannot similarly influence A's constitutional
right of choice, we speak of the legislature's disability in that respect, and of the individual's correlative immunity. As might be realized from this discussion, the pairs of words, right-no right,
liberty-duty (not), power-disability, and liability-immunity, express legal opposites.
So far we have spoken only of individual rights against legislative action. This is the natural consequence of incorporating Dworkin's concern for the priority of rights above all collective goals into
his notion of a vertical ordering. It is, however, apparent that individuals also have rights against other individuals; we shall characterize these kinds of rights in the same way. That is, we shall speak of a
vertical ordering of individual rights of choice with lower order individuals taking the place of a lower order legislature, at least with
respect to some issues. Thus, to reiterate the above example, an individual A may have a right to not-z, but no right either for or against
the alternatives x or y. Correlatively, individual B has a duty to notz, but a liberty to choose either x or y or both. But if individual A
has the higher order choice, or the right over the set (xy,z), then he
or she has an immunity against B with respect to that choice, leaving
B subject to a disability. Similarly, because B's liberties are subject
to change according to A's actual choices, B is under a liability and
A has the correlative power. Thus, jural relations between individuals can exactly parallel jural relations between an individual and his
87
or her legislature.

RELEVANCE FOR ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW

Some comments on the implications of the preceding discussion
86. Thus, this is a liberty which does not include a duty to make a particular choice.
Because a liberty to choose x is only the legal opposite of a duty not to choose x, it could,
technically, include a duty to choose x. Compare Williams, The Concept of Legal Liberty, in
ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 121, 121-45 (R. Summers ed. 1956) with Smith, Liberties and
Choice, 19 AM. J. JuRis. 87, 87-93 (1974).
87. For a further discussion of this kind of Hohfeldian interpretation of rights and liberties in choice-theoretic terms, see Chapman, Law, Morality, and the Logic of Choice: An
Economist's View, 29 U. TORONTO L. J. 114, 133-36 (1979).
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for economic analysis of the law are now in order. First, it should be
observed that although much of this paper has been normative
rather than descriptive in nature, and directed to problems of social
choice theory, this discussion may have behavioural implications for
individual choice as well. For example, if an individual is motivated
by such deontological concerns as rights, processes, or corrective justice, then, over observable alternatives, the individual may not reveal
a transitive preference ordering and so cannot therefore be construed
as maximizing anything. We have already alluded to this problem in
a roundabout way in our earlier discussion of Coase's theorem, but
the following example makes the point more explicitly."
Suppose an individual must choose which of three candidates,
A, B, or C, should be given an award. The individual responds that
in a choice between A and B he would choose A, since A will do
more good with the award than B. For the same reason, he chooses B
over C. Thus, since A will do more good with the award than B, and
B will do more good than C, by transitivity (and, let us suppose, by
assumption), A will do more good with the award than C. But the
individual says that in a choice between A and C he would choose C,
since A owes C some money and the individual feels it right and
proper on grounds of corrective justice to give the award to C in the
presence of A. The result is an intransitive revealed-preference ordering of the three alternatives for choice. 8 ' Yet, there does not seem
to be anything irrational going on. The concern for corrective justice
is what motivates the individual to choose C over A, since A owes C
money. This relationship of debtor-creditor holds only between A
and C, or, in terms of our earlier discussion, only for the partition
(A, C) of the alternatives. That is, it is not that more corrective justice applies in the choice over (A,C) than applies in the choice over
(A,B) or (BC). Rather, corrective justice considerations do not apply for the latter partitions at all. 90 Not surprisingly, therefore, such
88. The example which follows appears in Reynolds & Paris, The Concept of 'Choice'
and Arrow's Theorem, 89 ETHIcS 354, 363 (1979).
89. Condition C can also be shown to be violated. Suppose the individual chose B from
the set (A,B.C). He or she might say: "In the presence of C, I cannot choose A. Therefore, I
shall choose B because he will do more good than C." Now, if C is dropped from the attainable
set (perhaps because C dies), then the individual might reason that A is the best choice from
the set (A,B) since corrective justice no longer applies. But the choices C(AB,C) = B and
C(A,B) = A together violate condition C.
90. The intransitivity does not depend on a lexicographical priority given to a concern
for corrective justice. It could be, for example, that there is some price, in terms of the greater
good that A can do with the award, which will induce the individual to choose A over C. This
point has not yet been reached in the example under consideration.
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an individual's choices may be partition (or path) dependent and,
consequently, inconsistent with revealing a transitive, or even an
acyclic-preference ordering. Without such an ordering, however, the
individual cannot be thought of as a (utility) maximizer and so the
behavioural maxims of economics, and in particular of economic
analysis of law, may not apply.
On the normative side, the implications for economic analysis of
law as a rationale for social choice can be treated more briefly. It is
clear from a recent article by Posner' 1 that the normative basis for
economic analysis of law involves a kind of maximization principle-in particular the principle of wealth maximization. Posner
claims that this principle mixes the virtues of Kant and Bentham
without the disadvantages of either.' Yet, Kant and Bentham are
probably the most prominent deontological and consequentialist theorists respectively, and we should be suspicious of any atterhipt to
mix the two under the single rubric of a maximization principle. It
would thus seem that the normative basis for economic analysis of
law will have to be found elsewhere.
Finally, something should be said about "the comparative institution approach" in economics,9 3 an approach which has fathered
much of economic analysis of law. Contrasting itself with the "nirvana approach"94 (which points to discrepancies between an ideal
and a real institution and concludes that the real is inefficient), the
comparative institution approach attempts to assess which alternative real institutional arrangement seems best able to cope with the
economic problem. The economic problem, of course, involves getting people what they want at the lowest cost. But, as Plott has suggested,9 5 the lessons of social choice theory may be pointing to the
futility of this whole exercise. It may be incoherent even to ask what
kinds of processes give people what they want, since what people
want will depend upon the process or institution generating the outcomes. And, as Plott has indicated,
[i]f there is no outcome that the group "wants" independently of
91. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.LEGAL STUD. 103
(1979).
92. Id. at 119-36.
93. See generally Coase, supra note 1; Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another
Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1969).
94. See Demsetz, supra note 93, at 1-2.
95. Levine & Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 VA. L. REV. 561, 588
(1977); Plott, Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation.20 AM. J.
POL. Sci. 511, 553 (1976).
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the procedure used to reach the decision, all one can do is choose
an acceptable agenda that dictates the final result. . . . Perhaps
any initial ethical reactions to overt examples of nonneutral
processes rest on mistaken notions of the alternatives available to
us. Further explorations of process (agenda) acceptability independent of result might point toward principled resolutions of these
problems."
Needless to say, the problem of choosing acceptable procedures cannot be set up as a usual choice-theoretic maximization problem without generating all the difficulties exposed by social choice theory
and, as this paper shows, without biasing the choice away from a
sensible treatment of procedures altogether. Moreover, it is not clear
7
how a different approach to the problem might be structured.9 I
hope that this paper has generated some interest in a search for
alternatives.

96. Levine & Plott, supra note 95, at 588-89.
97. For some preliminary suggestions, see Plott, Ethics, Social Choice Theory and the
Theory of Economic Policy, 2 J. MATH. Soc. 181 (1972).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1982

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 7

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol10/iss2/7

28

